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Abstract
This paper documents a strong empirical relationship between the
supply of mortgage loans and consumption in the U.S. during the 2008
financial crisis. The estimates indicate that a negative shock to the sup-
ply of mortgage is associated with a decline in the consumption ex-
penses. We present a stylized model of household credit and consump-
tion, and analyse implications of an adverse shock to the mortgage sup-
ply. The model predicts that households react to an adverse mortgage
shock by cutting consumption expenditures, especially if they are at
their borrowing constraints. Empirically, following a one standard de-
viation decrease in mortgage issuance, we found that the consumption
growth was affected in 2009 and 2010 with a decrease of 0.051 and 0.036
percentage point respectively. Mortgage refinance shock accounts for
approximately 50% of the decline of in consumption growth. Lower-
income households are more vulnerable and react more strongly to ad-
verse shocks than higher-income households.
Keywords: Mortgage, Financial Shock, Heterogeneity, Consumption
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Résumé
Cet article documente une forte relation empirique entre l ’offre de
crédits hypothécaires et la consommation aux États - Unis au cours de
la crise financière de 2008. Les estimations indiquent qu’un choc né-
gatif à l’offre d’hypothèque est associé à une baisse des dépenses de
consommation. Nous présentons un modèle stylisé de crédit et de la
consommation des ménages, et analysons les implications d’un choc né-
gatif sur l’offre de crédit hypothécaire. Le modèle prédit que les mé-
nages réagissent à un choc négatif d’offre hypothécaire en réduisant
leurs dépenses de consommation, surtout s’ils sont confrontés à des con-
traintes d’emprunt. Empiriquement, suite à une baisse de 1% de l’offre
hypothécaire, nous avons constaté que la croissance de la consomma-
tion avait été affectée en 2009 et 2010 avec une diminution de 0.051 et de
0.036 point respectivement. Un choc sur le refinancement hypothécaire
représente environ 50% de la baisse de la croissance de la consomma-
tion. Les ménages à faible revenu sont plus vulnérables et réagissent
plus fortement aux chocs défavorables que les ménages à revenu plus
élevé.




The recent crisis has plunged the world economy into a deep recession
over the past few years and has had severe consequences on both real and
financial economy. Many explanations were given for the causes of that deep
recession; some authors pointed out the fall in aggregate demand (Mian
and Sufi, 2014), others pointed the uncertainty (Baker, Bloom and Davis,
2016, Bloom et al., 2012), and others structural factors. As the consequences,
many sectors were severely harmed and had a long and very slow recov-
ery. Employment fell by over 7% in US, the public finance experienced a
crunch, firms balance sheets were on deficit 1. Among the factors that explain
the current economic downturn, while reasonable hypotheses have been put
forward, an empirically relevant approach must quantitatively explain four
facts that collectively define the recession: the sharp rise in household de-
faults, the fall in house prices, the drop in consumption (durables), and the
rise in unemployment.
Over the past few years, especially at the offset of the great recession,
the topic of household finance has brought the attention of many researchers
(Baker Scott R, 2013, Mian, Rao and Sufi, 2010, 2013). These authors find
that the crisis had several effects on the households finance, regarding their
limited access to credit, their leverage, their balance sheet and finally their
consumption. In fact, Mian and Sufi (2010) argue that the components of
GDP that initially declined in 2007 and early 2008 were fixed residential in-
vestment and durable consumption.
As rich as these studies can be, there is still a remaining question: how
much the decline in non-housing consumption can be attributed to or ex-
plained by the tightening in the supply of credit to households? What is the
geographical distribution of the shocks to the supply of credit? Is there any
heterogeneous effect across households? This paper tries to give an empirical
explanation to these questions.
The topic in itself raises a lot of interest considering the following facts: (i)
the US economy is mostly a consumption-based economy, that is, when the
consumption suffers from any friction, there will be a direct impact on the
entire economy and could easily lead to a recession; (ii) for the last 2 decades,
the market of credit has been expanding and showed to researchers a lot of
interest, especially at the onset of the 2008 crisis. So it’s important to evaluate
what the effects could be in all the sectors of the economy, especially the
non-housing consumption, which accounts for a large part in the aggregate
1. John Mondragon (2014), Chodrow, Reich (2014)
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demand.
The goal of the present paper is to assess to which extend disruptions in
the credit market affect households’ non-housing consumption. More specif-
ically, the paper tries to: (i) provide estimates of the supply shocks to house-
hold credit, using the methodology used by Greenstone and Mas (2012),
followed by Amiti and Weinstein (2013) and Niepmann, Schmidt Eisenlohr
(2013); (ii) estimate the elasticity of consumption 2 with respect to declines in
household credits caused by credit supply shocks. We give the average effect
across counties; (iii) take into account the heterogeneity among households
in different counties, by providing evidence of interesting heterogeneous ef-
fects on the rich versus poor counties. We also check if, for a given size of
the shock, the magnitude of the effect differ for counties with different char-
acteristics; (iv) finally analyse these effects in a simple theoretical frame. For
that, we propose a simple model inspired by DeFusco and Paciorek (2016)
and John Mondragon (2014) that use two types of borrowers (constrained
and non constrained) with their preferences that face optimization problems.
As documented in the literature, there are two main ways a credit shock
can affect financial stability through the consumption. The relationship be-
tween household debt and future growth and financial stability depends on
several factors and can be negative or positive. On one hand, the perma-
nent income theory argues that household debt has beneficial effects on the
macroeconomy and on financial stability. Households that anticipate an in-
crease in future income will increase their debt to smooth their consumption
or make large investments in nonfinancial assets or education 3. The relation-
ship may be positive if agents behave in a rational, forward looking manner
and contract debt solely with an eye on future income growth and returns
to capital in the absence of financial frictions and binding borrowing con-
straints. On the other hand, newer theories and empirical evidence show
that the relationship between household debt and macro-financial stability
can also be negative. More recent consumption and debt theories relax some
of the assumptions of the permanent income model and consider the con-
sequences of borrowing constraints, negative externalities, and behavioral
biases 4.
2. Due to the availability of the data, we will only focus on the non-housing consumption.
3. In this context, demographics and the distribution of income and debt matter. Younger
households that anticipate future income growth would borrow more against their future
income (Blundell, Browning, and Meghir 1994). Rajan (2010) and Kumhof, Rancière, and
Winant (2015) have argued that increased income and wealth inequality led to the rapid
growth of household debt in the United States and eventually to the financial crisis in
2008.Coibion and others (2017) find that, over the period 2001 − 2012, income inequality
may have indirectly operated as a screening device for banks, given that theu lend less to
low income households in high inequality regions in the United States.
4. Market incompleteness may also play a role in households’ borrowing and saving de-
cisions
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The empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between
the mortgage shock and the change in consumption. Counties that experi-
ence the biggest negative shock in the issuance of the mortgage had faced
the largest decline in consumption. There is an heterogeneity regarding the
income groups. When the counties are clustered into 3 groups according to
their income, we found that the "poor" counties tended to be more vulnerable
and faced biggest decline in the consumption than the "rich" ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: section 2 presents the liter-
ature review and shed light ont the recent works that had been in relation
to the present work; section 3 presents the model and the economic setting;
section 4 describes data and compute some summary statistics; section 5 elab-
orates the empirical analysis, from how the mortgage shock is computed to
the different econometric results; finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The paper relates to a number of strands of literature in both macroeco-
nomics and finance and can be classified in three main groups.
The first part summarises the recent works on the credit supply shocks. It
is a topic that is still very growing and raises much attention these past years.
These are related to the credit shocks and its effect on the economic activity.
Most of the studies are focusing on credit to firms and businesses, but only a
few on housing credit. These include John Modragon (2014), Jagdish Tripa-
thy (2016), Greenstone and Mas (2012), Chodorow-Reich (2014) and DiMag-
gio and Kermani (2014), Amiti and Weinstein (2013).
John Modragon (2014) studied the relation between the contraction in the
supply of credit to households and the decline in the employment during
the Great Recession. He instrumented credit supply shock with county’s ex-
posure to the collapse of a large previously healthy lender (Wachovia Bank).
He found an elasticity of employment with respect to household credit of 0.3,
caused by decline in housing and non-housing consumption. He estimated a
size of the shock using non parametrical identification of the lender-specific
shocks to household and found a global contribution to the decline of em-
ployment of 3.6% between 2007 and 2010.
Instead of using the county exposure to a specific lender, Jagdish Tripathy
(2016) exploited variations across Mexican municipalities to look at the effect
of household credit shock on sectoral composition. He identified a negative
shock to the credit supply resulting from exogenous macro-prudential regu-
lations in early 2012 in Spain. He showed that municipalities with a greater
3
exposure to the shock experienced a higher drop in investments in the non-
tradable sector (1.6-3.5), whereas investments in the tradable sector remained
unaffected.
Working on loans to businesses, Greenstone and Mas (2012) estimates the ef-
fect of the reduction in the credit supply that followed the 2008 financial crisis
on the real economy, especially on employment. Exploiting substantial het-
erogeneity in the extent to which different national bank cut their small busi-
ness lending during the financial crisis, and isolating the portion of these cuts
attributed to supply factors, they predicted the change in county level small
business lending over 2007-2009 period using interactions of banks’ pre-crisis
county market shares and their national change in lending. Amiti and Wein-
stein (2013) used the same methodology to discuss the effect of supply-side
financial on firms’ investment in Japan from 1990 to 2010.
To address the same question, Chodorow-Reich (2014) instead used the dis-
persion in lender health following the Lehman crisis as a source of exogenous
variation in the availability of credit to borrowers. Firms that have pre-crisis
relationships with less healthy lenders had a 55% lower likelihood of obtain-
ing a loan following the Lehman bankruptcy, paid a higher rate if they did
borrow, and reduced employment by more, compared to pre-crisis clients of
healthier lenders.
DiMaggio and Kermani (2014) studies the impact of credit expansion on the
house prices and real economic activity. The methodology is quite different
from other in the sense that they exploit heterogeneity in the market share of
national banks across counties and in state anti-predatory laws to instrument
for an outward shift in the supply of credit. The particularity of the instru-
ment is that it allows to investigate, controlling for regional differences, how
lending to riskier borrowers affects several sectors of the economy. The re-
sults show that the increase of the lending led to increase of house prices and
expansion of employment in the non-tradable sector. But these effects were
followed by a decline in loan origination, house prices and employment of
similar magnitude in the subsequent years.
All these papers have in common the estimation of the credit supply shocks
using different approaches. But the outcome is mainly investments and em-
ployment and the question of consumption response to those shocks in not
addressed. To contribute to this growing literature, we look at the effect on
the consumption, which is also an important part of the aggregate demand
and thus the economic activity.
Furthermore, our paper uses mortgage data. So, it also relates to the lit-
erature concerning the mortgage credits and its implication on the economic
activity. The more close to our study are Mian and Sufi (2009, 2010), Favara,
Imbs (2010), Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2014).
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Mian and Sufi (2009) attempt to separate the effect of an expansion in the
supply of credit from potentially confounding effects of contemporaneous
changes in the demand for mortgages. They argue that the expansion in the
supply of mortgage credit led to a rapid increase in house prices from 2001
to 2005 and subsequent defaults from 2005 to 2007. Their approach is de-
signed to isolate the causal effect of the supply expansion of mortgage credit
growth, house price growth, and subsequent defaults. On the other hand,
Favara, Imbs (2010) identifies exogenous shifts in the supply of credit with
regulatory changes to bank branching across US states, traces their effects
on the size and standards of mortgage loans and evaluates their impact on
house prices. They found a significant effect on the house prices and used US
branching deregulations between 1994 and 2005 as instruments for credit 5.
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2014) show that the credit supply in the
mortgage market driven by looser lending constraints was the main cause of
the housing boom that preceded the Great Recession.
The different studies mentioned above somehow lack a theoretical model to
explain the channel through which the effect of a mortgage shock on the eco-
nomic activity is driven. We try to complete that with a theoretical model
that explains clearly how can a reduction of the mortgage issuance affect non
housing consumption.
Finally, because our study concerns the consumption as the main interest
outcome, it’s related also to Mian and Sufi (2010), Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013)
and Baker Scott R (2013).
Mian and Sufi (2010) focused on cross-sectional variation of economic vari-
ables across US counties in the severity of the recession to assess the house-
hold leverage as a powerful predictor of the 2007-2009 recession. More specif-
ically, they found that counties in the US that experienced a large increase
in household leverage from 2002 to 2006 showed a sharp relative decline in
durable consumption starting in the third quarter of 2006. Similarly, coun-
ties with the highest reliance on credit card borrowing reduced durable con-
sumption by significantly more following the financial crisis of the fall of
2008. Household leverage growth and dependence on credit card borrowing
explain a large fraction of the overall consumer default, house price, unem-
ployment, residential investment, and durable consumption patterns during
the recession.
Mian Rao and Sufi (2013) provide detailed empirical evidence on the distri-
bution of wealth shocks across the US population at the onset of the Great
Recession and on the consumption. They used the cross-sectional variation
in consumption and net housing wealth decline at the county level and found
several results: (i) the elasticity of consumption with respect to housing net
5. They argued that the deregulation affected the supply of mortgage loans, and via its
effects on credit, the price of housing.
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worth varies from 0.6 to 0.8, (ii) households with larger decline in housing net
wealth experience a stronger reduction in credit limit and greater difficulty
in refinancing their mortgage into lower interest rates, (iii) The Marginal
Propensity to Consume (MPC) falls between 5 and 7 cents for every dollar
fall in housing net wealth and is disproportionately borne by households
that have an equity claim on the housing market.
Baker Scott R (2013) exploits a detailed new dataset with comprehensive
financial information on households to investigate the interaction between
household balance sheets, income, and consumption during the Great Re-
cession. The strategy is to match households with their employers and use
shocks to these employers to derive persistent and unanticipated changes
in household income. He found that highly indebted households are more
sensitive to these income fluctuations and that a one standard deviation in-
crease in debt-to-asset ratios increases the elasticity of consumption by ap-
proximately 25%.
For this part, the authors did not really assess the impact of a credit sup-
ply shocks to consumption. Instead, they found a relation between house-
hold wealth shock - notably their leverage and income - and consumption.
Andreas Lehnert (2004): Housing, consumption and credit constraints. The
author finds a relationship between house prices and consumption. Partic-
ularly, he tests whether the consumption impact of price shocks is greater
among credit constrained households than among other households. He
identifies credit constrained households by age.
To complete these studies, we include an important heterogeneity source,
which is the income. We provide empirical results and show that there is a
heterogeneity on the effect of mortgage shock on the consumption based on
the income of households; using a simple classification, "poor" households
are more affected than "rich" ones.
3 The model
In this section we develop a very simple model of heterogeneous house-
holds that borrow from financial intermediaries (lenders). In case of a change
in the supply of mortgage, we look at the effects on the non-durable con-
sumption.
The model is a combined modification of John Mondragon (2014), Jus-
tiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2015) and DeFusco and Paciorek (2016)
The goal of this model is twofold: (i) First, we aim to develop a theoreti-
cal mechanism through which a supply shock in mortgage could affect non-
durable consumption through the interest rate channel; (ii) Secondly, we aim
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to construct the credit supply shock so that we can match the methodology
of Greenstone and Mas that is used in our paper.
3.1 Economic setting
We consider a two-period model where there is a representative consumer
(household). The household holds physical capital (which is to be his home
once he buys it) that is financed with the mortgage. There is no uncertainty.
Since we want to derive an effect of the mortgage change in the non -
durable consumption, we will shut down the hypothesis of homeowner/renter
and consider that the household has housing consumption (h) in the first pe-
riod at an exogenous per-unit price of p that can be depreciated in the sec-
ond period at rate δ . The household has the choice to finance his housing
consumption with a mortgage, m, or not. In the case he chooses to finance
his housing consumption, the mortgage must not exceed the value of their
house 6. In the second period, the house faces some depreciation, the mort-
gage is paid off, and the household consume all of their remaining wealth.
The borrower solves the following problem:
max
{c1,c2,I∈[0,1],m,h}
VI(C) = u(c1, h) + βu(c2, h)
s.t.:

c1 + p.h.I = y1 + m.I
c2 + (1 + r)m.I = (1− δ).p.h.I + y2
0≤ m ≤ θ.p.h
Where c1 and c2 denote the consumption of the non - durable goods at the
first and second period respectively, u is the utility function derived from that
consumption and from the housing consumption , β ∈ (0,1) is the discount
factor, I is an indicator variable that express the choice to take the mortgage
or not 7, h is the housing consumption valued at price p, m is the mortgage
loan and δ is the depreciation factor of the house. θ represent the maximum
allowed Loan-to-value ratio. It is the maximum fraction of the value of the
house the borrower can get. In the literature, it’s referred as the leverage.
3.2 Implications of the model on the consumption growth
The problem of the household can be rewritten as:
max
m,h
{VI(C) = u(y1 + m.I − p.h.I, h) + βu((1− δ).p.h.I.y2 − (1 + r)m.I, h)}
6. The lender use that constraint to make sure that somehow, the household is able to
repay the mortgage he took
7. Depending on the utility function, I may never be 0. This would be the case if the
marginal utility is decreasing, that is, the household would always want to take a mortgage
7
s.t.:0≤ m ≤ θ.p.h
3 I = 0: The consumer doesn’t take the mortgage











Then the consumption growth rate is simply the income of the second
period relative to the first period. Therefore it’s not affected by a shock in the
mortgage.
The Value function is:
VI=0 = u(c1) + βu(c2)
= u(y1) + βu(y2)
3 I = 1: The consumer takes the mortgage The Lagrangian gives:
L= u(y1 +m.I− p.h.I, h)+ βu((1− δ).p.h.I.y2− (1+ r)m.I, h)−λ(m− θ.p.h)
The F.O.C (First Order Condition) gives:

m : u1(c1, h)− λ = β(1 + r)u1(c2, h) (1)
h : −pu1(c1, h) + u2(c1, h) + βp(1− δ)u1(c2, h) + βu2(c2, h) + λ.θ.p = 0 (2)
λ ≥ 0 and (λ = 0 i f m < θ.p.h) (3)
• Equation (1) is the classic Euler Equation (EE): It equates the marginal
benefit of higher consumption today against the marginal cost of lower
consumption tomorrow.
• Equation (2) characterizes the housing consumption demand by the bor-
rower: It equates the net cost of forgone consumption today to purchase
an additional unit of housing today, with the benefit of enjoying this
house tomorrow, and then selling it (after depreciation) in exchange for
goods. Basically it shows the inter temporal condition between the de-
cision of consume and the decision to invest in housing consumption.
• Equation (3) defines two cases; the first where the borrower is not con-
strained (m = θ.p.h) and the second where he is constrained (m < θ.p.h)
We consider a particular form of the utility function so we can derive the
different demand functions of the household. For simplicity, we consider the
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logarithm utility function:
u(c, h) = ln(C) + α ln(h)
The parameters β, δ are assumed to be constant. α is the portion (or the share)
of the total consumption that is allowed to the housing consumption.
Given this utility function, the marginal utility is decreasing, that will lead
the consumer to always want to consume. Therefore, he will always be will-
ing to take a mortgage (I = 1).
We solve the problem and derive the different demand functions: Con-
sumption, Mortgage and Housing.
3.2.1 Non constrained borrower
The non constrained borrower is the one that doesn’t hit his constraint;
that is, he is characterized by:
m < θ.p.h
Therefore, his lagrange multiplier is null.





= β(1 + r)
The housing demand is a decreasing function of the price of the house and
the interest rate, but is an increasing function of the incomes in each period.
The consumption in the first period is decreasing in the interest rate while in
the second period it’s an increasing function of r. This highlights the substi-
tution effect in the model. In the case there is an increase on the mortgage
rate, the consumer finds it difficult to consume today (c1 drops), especially
when he took a mortgage; therefore he has to reduce the actual consumption
to repay 8 his mortgage and increases his tomorrow consumption (c2 jumps
up).
To look at the effect on the consumption, we are going to take the derivative
of the consumption growth with respect to the mortgage and look at its sign.
The borrower takes the interest rate r as given, but the latter is a function
of the mortgage supply 9. So, the inverse supply function of the mortgage
8. Unfortunately, the repayment are not taken into account in this model
9. We focus non the supply side because we want to see the effect of the supply shock of








= β(1 + rs(m))
Considering a specific supply function of mortgage, the law of supply can
be applied, and it states that the interest rate is an increasing function of the
amount of mortgage offered by lenders. So, rs(m) is an increasing function of
m. Then, an increase in m will increase the supply rate rs, and hence increase
the consumption rate. That is, the borrower reduces his current to increase
future consumption.
3.2.2 Constrained borrower
The constrained borrower hits his constraint and because he want more
mortgage to purchase his house, he will reach the upper limit of the amount
allowable for him:
m = θ.p.h
Proposition 3.2. The consumption growth for a constrained agent as a function of







In this case, we have:
• ∂c1∂m =
θ−1
θ < 0, because θ < 1. That is, an increase in m leads to a decrease
of the current consumption.
• ∂c2∂m =
1−δ
θ − (1 + r). The sign of this expression depends on the value
of θ, δ and r. Let’s recall that θ represents the maximum borrowing
capacity (leverage). It also gives an indication of the level of debt of a
borrower. For a borrower that is not constrained, his leverage θ is low;




> 0 ⇒ 1− δ
θ
> 1 + r
⇒ θ < 1− δ
1 + r
If θ is small enough, then in order to find the substitution effect in con-
sumption, we’ll find that a positive mortgage shock will increase tomorrow
consumption, and hence the consumption growth.
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With this result, we see that wether the borrower is constrained or not,
a negative shock of the mortgage supply will have a negative effect on the
non housing consumption. One concern may be the magnitude of the effect.
We believe that comparing two borrowers with one constrained and the other
not, the negative effect will not be the same on both. The constrained one will
have the worse effect, although the non constrained one will have a lighter
negative effect.
Another limit of this model is, it only shows the effect of a reduction of the
mortgage issuance on the consumption but not the actual supply side of the
reduction. Since the focus of this paper is to look at the supply shock, we aim
to present a framework where we disentangle the supply and the demand




According to the different variables that we use in our study, we have 4
principle data sources: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), AC Nielsen
consumer panel, New York Federal Reserve Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel
dataset and IRS Statistics of Income.
The data I use to measure the household credits are from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). It’s an application-level database constructed by the
Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC) from disclosure
reports submitted by mortgage lenders, by counties and by Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Area (MSA). I specifically rely on the flow of "Home purchase", the
"Home Improvement" and the "Home refinance" to measure the household
credit 11 . The data give various characteristics of the loan and applicant by
county, including: the loan amount, the population, the loan purpose (home
purchase, home refinance or home improvement), the property type, the me-
dian income, the identifier of the lender, the census tract of the property for
which the loan is used. The sample period goes from 2007 to 2011.
Among many types of mortgage loans, the HMDA provides mainly the
"conventional loans". Basically, the conventional mortgage is a type of home
buyer’s loan that is not offered or secured by a government entity, like the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the U.S Department of Veteran Af-
10. This is well documented in the Appendix.
11. Ideally, to measure the impact of the credit shocks to households, we would use the
consumption credit, not the mortgage credit. But the absence of data on consumption credit
forced us to use the mortgage data. See John Mondragon (2014) for more details.
11
fairs (VA), but rather available through or guaranteed by private lender, or
the two government sponsored enterprises, the Federal Mortgage Associa-
tion (Fannie Mae), and the Feral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac) 12 .This is the type of mortgage that will be used in our study.
For non-housing consumption, I rely on the AC Nielsen consumer panel.
This consumer panel data represents a longitudinal set of approximately
60,000 U.S. households - from 2007 onwards - who continually provide in-
formations to Nielsen about their households, what products they buy, the
prices, as well as when and where they make purchases. Products include all
Nielsen-tracked categories of food and non-food items, across all retail out-
lets in all U.S. markets. Nielsen samples all states and major markets. The
panelists are geographically dispersed and demographically balanced. The
data contain information on households at the barcode level and at a quar-
terly frequency.
Data on consumer debts (auto and credit card debts) are taken from the
New York Federal Reserve Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel dataset.
Although there are approximately three thousand counties in the U.S., all of
them will not be used in our study. In fact, the choice of the counties for
our study depends first on the availability of the data in those counties, and
most importantly they size. The activities in the counties are very heteroge-
neous due to their sizes, which is defined here by their populations. Data
on the populations come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) avail-
able at the Census Bureau. Using that variable, we chose counties that have
an estimated population of at least 10 thousands with credit reported in 2010.
The income data are taken from the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI). The
SOI data reports the total amount of income received by households at the
ZIP code level. The total income includes Wages and salaries, interest pay-
ment, dividend, and some alimonies. All those elements form the Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI) and represents the taxable income for each household.
Using the population criteria, we merged the different datasets that we have
(NyFed, Nielsen and HMDA) and brought down to 2150 counties in our
study.
12. Fannie Mae (officially the Federal National Mortgage Association, or FNMA) is a
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) - that is, a publicly traded company which oper-
ates under Congressional charter - to stimulate homeownership and expand the liquidity of
mortgage money by creating a secondary market. Freddie Mac (FHLMC) is a stockholder
- owned, government - sponsored enterprise (GSE) chartered by Congress in 1970 to keep
money flowing to mortgage lenders in support of homeownership and rental housing for
middle income Americans. The FHLMC purchases, guarantees and securitizes mortgages
to form mortgage - backed securities.
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4.2 Summary Statistics
Before we get into the estimations, it’s important that we take a look at
some descriptive analysis to see how the different variables interact and what
effect could we expect in the econometric estimations.
During the whole period, the overall loan origination were decreasing, but
there was a pick in 2009. Also, the biggest component on the total origination
in the mortgage is the refinance. So, the whole evolution in the mortgage is
mainly attributed to the home refinancing.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the mortgage issuance and its different pur-
poses from 2007 to 2011. The pick in 2009 can be explained with the move-
ment of the interest rate. In fact, as explained in the literature, the decline
of the interest rate (as shown in the Figure 2) is an opportunity for borrow-
ers to renegotiate or to take a second mortgage (for those who already got
one), to refinance the first one at lower prices. This is to get low repayment
stream for their loans over time. But as time goes, the trend is declining. As
documented in the literature, the interest rate is a negative function of the
mortgage debt. Therefore, as the mortgage issuance decreases over time, we
normally expect the interest rate to go up. But this relationship is not what
is shown on the figures. One thing that could explain this is the extensive
margin, that is, even when the loan origination were cut globally, they were
more cut to the poorest (Subprime) and offered to the richest (Prime).
As shown in Figure 3, there is a negative relationship between the consump-
tion and the mortgage issuance. But this figures hides a lot of heterogeneity,
because according to some factors (the average income for example) the re-
lation may not be the same. We can descriptively look more in details the
interactions of the consumption and the mortgage issuance throughout the
years. For that, we split the data into 3 income groups (top quartile (25%),
bottom quartile (25%) and middle 50%) regarding their 2008− 2011 income.
For each group, we look at the number of loans issued, the amount of the
loan issued and the total consumption expenditures. On one hand, Figure
4 confirms that the loans were cut off from the "poorest" counties and were
more offered to the "richest", because of their solvability and their ability to
repay and sustain a debt. Looking at the curves, we can predict a positive
relation between the mortgage supply shock and the consumption for the 3
groups for at least the first 3 years (2008− 2010). In 2011, there is a sort of
negative relation between both. On the other hand, in Figure 5, the number
of loans in each income group is highly correlated with the amount of loan
issued in these groups. This could give a descriptive explanation as to why
the mortgage were still decreasing even though the interest rate were still
decreasing. This result shows us that the supply of loans is based both on
the intensive and the extensive margin: The intensive margin for the amount
of loans given to different income groups, and the extensive margin for the
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number of the loans that were offered to different income groups. In the
econometric specification, we will go into more details to explain the contri-
bution of some factors on the issuance of the mortgage.
Table 1 presents the statistics of the consumption from 2008 to 2011. we
see a decline in the consumption growth in 2008 and 2009 of 0.14% and 0.28%
respectively, which are the years were the crisis were more severe and thus
there were decline in the aggregate demand, especially in consumption. For
those same years, the median value is negative, meaning that the consump-
tion of 50% of the population fell under 0.13% and 0.34% respectively. But
right back in the 2010 and 2011, there were a substantial growth in the con-
sumption of 0.21% and 0.47%.
Comparing the consumption habit between the income groups (that we
created above), Table 2 provides us the growth in each income groups. We
can see that throughout the years, the bottom quartile was the most affected
by the crisis 13. Again, 2009 was the toughest year for all of them and the post
crisis (2011) was economically positive with all positive growths.
The motivation of choosing only 3 lenders (JP Morgan Chase, Bank of
America, Wells fargo) among many others are due to their intensity in the
activity of lending to the households. More specifically, among around 8000
lenders each year, those 3 lenders account for 20 to 27% of the share of all
the lending in the country, just like shown in figure 6. Figure 7 shows the
co-movement between their lending and the total lending in the country;
the curves show that the chosen lenders are very representative of the total
lending in the country. .
5 Empirical Analysis
Our main goal is to elaborate an empirical methodology to look at the
effect of the mortgage shock on the non housing consumption. First, we
compute the mortgage shock following the theoretical model described in
the appendix. Then, we validate the instrument (relevance of the instrument
and omitted variables). Later on, we provide the main results.
The average effect of the credit supply shock to households on consump-
tion can then be estimated sing the following regression:
∆Log(Cit) = αi + βt + δ× Shockit + Xit + εit (1)
Where: Cit is the consumption spending at time t in the county i ; αi and
βt are county and time fixed effect respectively; Xit is the set of control vari-
13. If we consider that the only factor that affected their consumption habit is the crisis.
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ables 14; and εit is the error term. Under the assumption that the computed
supply shock are not systematically correlated with unobserved character-
istics that vary at the time - county level and are correlated with consump-
tion, δ corresponds to the causal effect of mortgage supply shocks on con-
sumption growth. Expressed in formulas, the identification assumption is:
E(Shockit × εit) = 0. In other words, a lender’s change in lending does not
covary with factors that determine the county - level outcomes.
The identification approach exploits within-state across-county hetero-
geneity and their exposure to the three biggest mortgage lenders from 2007
to 2011. The main challenge of the identification strategy is to provide good
estimates of the credit shocks that specifically isolate the supply side and the
global effect on consumption with regards to that heterogeneity. The hetero-
geneity across counties will help me to separate the credit supply shock from
other possible confounding mechanisms (especially demand shock).
5.1 Estimating the credit supply shocks
To estimate the credit supply shock, we use the methodology of Green-
stone and Mas (2012), followed by Amiti and Weinstein (2013) and Niep-
mann, Schmidt and Eisenlhor (2013). This has the advantage that it helps us
to disentangle both the supply and demand variations of the loan origina-
tion.
This empirical estimation finds its theoretical background in John Mondragon
(2014) 15
An originated loan can be seen as a result from the confrontation between
the borrower and the lender, and is susceptible to confounding demand and
supply shocks. Therefore, a change in the origination of loan to household
contains demand effects and supply effects, which we need to separate. To
address that, we construct an instrument for bank lending in county i in year
t as the sum across all banks that operate in i of the interaction between bank
market shares in t− 1 and changes in those banks’ national lending between
t− 1 and t.
Specifically, for each year t, we run the following regression:
∆ ln(Lijt) = dit + sjt + eijt (2)
Where: Lijt is the amount of loan originated from the lender j to the
county i at time t; dit is the borrower fixed effect, which can be interpreted
14. The set of control variables are well documented in the econometric section. It includes
Income, mortgage delinquencies, credit card deliquencies, refinance,
15. The model is developed in Appendix A. For further reading, the reader can directly
refer to the paper of the author.
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as the variation in banks’ changing that is due to the conditions of the local
economy 16. We interpret it also as demand effect. sjt is the lender fixed ef-
fect, which we interpret as the supply effect.
Here we are interested in the vector sjt that is computed for every pair of
consecutive years from 2007 17 . We finally use the lender’s specific supply
shock (sjt’s) to construct a county level of the predicted lending supply shock.
For each county and year, we compute the weighted average of the estimated
bank fixed effects, weighted by the bank’s base period market share in that
county 18.
Shockit = Σjshareijt−1 × sjt
Where shareijt−1 is the bank j’s market share in county i in the year prior
to the estimated shock 19.
Once the instrument is computed, the summary statistics show a little
variation over time, as presented in table 3. As shown in Figure 8, while the
values are centered on zero for most of the years, we can assume that there
are normally distributed. We then use the predicted lending supply shock as
an instrument to the credit supply shock.
5.2 Validation of instrument
The validation of the instrument depends on what exactly drives the credit
supply shocks. This is to see why the origination of loans to households dif-
fers across counties in the same state. If the source of that heterogeneity is
exogenous, then the instrument is valid.
5.2.1 Relevance of the instrument
The computed instrument must be strongly correlated to the supply of
credit to households and meet the condition of exclusive restriction (Identi-
fication assumption). This is simply to make sure that the instrument can be
used as a strong prediction of the change in the supply of mortgage.
We run the following regression:
∆ ln(Lt) = β0 + β1 × Shockt + εt
As clearly shown in the table 4 below, the coefficient of interest, which
is β1 is highly significative, and the F-statistic is very high, sign of a strong
16. See Greenstone and Mas (2012)
17. The choice of that date is due to the availability of the data.
18. The weight takes into account the number of banks operating in the county each year
which can be different).
19. The choice of the year prior to the shock is made to account for the exogenous variation
of the county exposure to shocks.
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correlation between the two variables.
Table 4 : Validation of the instrument: Correlation with the growth of the mortgage
origination
(2008− 2011) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Supply Shocks 0.208∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.090) (0.116) (0.186) (0.047)
Time FE No - - - -
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 8600 2150 2150 2150 2150
R2 0.079 0.526 0.453 0.820 0.630
F-Stat 68.21 51.10 55.04 27.54 43.54
Note: This table analyses the relationship between our estimated mort-
gage supply shocks and the actual mortgage origination. The dependent
variable is the growth of the mortgage. All regression include constant. Stan-
dard error are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
5.2.2 Omitted variables
One potential issue would be that the effect of credit supply shock on the
consumption might be biased by other confounding - beside the demand -
mechanisms. To address that, we regress the predicted lending shock com-
puted above on several other variables. These variables include: Debt to In-
come ratio (DTI), Log Income, and Log of total debt (this includes the mort-
gage, the credit card debt and the student loans debt). The ideal situation
would be the absence (or just a little) of any correlation, otherwise, the ef-
fect of the credit on consumption would be driven by some other factors and
would need to be purged by the latter.
Table 5 gives the results. Columns (1) − (3) take each variable individu-
ally. Even though the total debt and the income are individually significant,
the magnitude is almost null, which means that the variables almost are not
correlated. When putting these variables together, even though the income
and debt are significant, their magnitude is almost null. This means that the
computed shocks do not pick up demand effect. We can be sure that we dis-
entangled the supply shock from any confounding mechanism, the demand
mechanism in particular.
Column (4) takes all the variables together. Even though the magnitude of
the coefficients are very small, the time fixed effect accounts for 60.49% of
the variation of the supply shock. When the county fixed effects are added,
both of these variations account for 70% of the variation of the supply shock.
This shows that the computed shock does not pick up demand effects. To see
whether the estimates pick up time trend or not, we run the last regression
(Column (4)) for each year from 2008 to 2011. The results are shown in the
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Table 6. It is shown in that table that there is not a time trend effect, because
the coefficient are almost null and for the most part non significant.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Baseline results
The results below are from the benchmark model (1). The control variable
that we used here is the change of income from the IRS database.The choice
of the variable is justified by its ability of having an effect on the consumption
growth. The theories of consumption stress the income as a determinant of
the consumption habits. the dependent variable is the change in consump-
tion, the income variable should also be taken as a change. The income cho-
sen here is the Adjusted Gross Income per return which is the average taxable
income per habitant in the county 20.
For us to control for the time fixed effect, we run the baseline regression
year by year to see if there is a time-trend in the effect of mortgage supply
shock on the consumption.
The results are clustered by states. This is to see whether the belonging to one
state or another can influence the effect of the mortgage on consumption.
Therefore, for each of those years, we control for the state fixed effects, and
we cluster by state. The positive coefficient indicates that the destination
counties that experienced the larger decline in the supply of the mortgage
exhibit lower consumption growth rate. A positive sign simply shows that
the counties that experienced large decline in the supply of mortgage had
the lowest consumption growth rate. The aggregate consumption was really
affected mostly on 2009 and 2010.
Grouping counties by state also gives us some homogeneity regarding the
difference of consumption growth between two counties that are one stan-
dard deviation apart in the origination of mortgage. Overall, in 2009 and
2010, for 2 counties that are 1 standard deviation apart in the origination of
mortgage, the differences in consumption growth between both are 0.051 and
0.036 percentage point respectively 21.
This is a noticeable result considering that the consumption habits and the
lending activity is not the same from one state to another. The magnitude
is higher in 2009 and 2010 as expected, because those are the years were the
crisis were more severe. This can be explained by the repayment that the con-
sumers have to face. As seen in the theoretical model, there is a substitution
between the housing consumption and the non-durable goods consumption;
because the consumers have decided to invest in housing, they now have
20. This can count as a proxy of the average income in the county.
21. These results come from the formula: Std_ShockStd_Consumption ∗ β
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to reduce their consumption to face the repayment which exhibits the lower
consumption growth.
Figure 9 presents the evolution of those effects throughout the time. As just
documented above, the impact on the reduction of the consumption were
very high in 2009 and 2010. The lower impact in 2011 is due to the post crisis.
Now that the effect of the mortgage shock on the consumption is defined
in the previous section, one question that one can ask is to know what drives
this effect. We mean the channel through that impact on consumption is
driven. To that purpose, we listed some control variables correlated with the
mortgage shock than can be the potential drivers of the effect. These are: the
income heterogeneity (different income groups), the computed shock of the
refinance, the credit card delinquencies, the mortgage delinquencies, and the
Debt to income ratio.
5.3.2 Income Heterogeneity and impact on the consumption
This subsection analyses the income heterogeneity as a potential channel
through the shock on a mortgage impacts the consumption change. We use
the same three groups defined in the previous section (bottom 25%, middle
50% and top 25%). We split the counties in three groups, and we compute
the shocks in those groups. Then we run the following regression, year by
year to avoid time trend effect:
∆Log(Ci) = α + δ1 × Shock25i + δ2 × Shock50i + δ3 × Shock75i + δ4 × Xi + εi
where Shock25, Shock50 and Shock75 are the computed shocks in each income
groups.
The results in Table 8 shows us what we expected, which is the lower in-
come counties are more severely affected. This results goes along with the
literature that says lower-income households are more vulnerable to adverse
shocks than higher-income households. A better visualisation of this partic-
ular results is shown in figure 10. The main effect on the total consumption
change is hardly driven by the effect on the lower income counties. This is an
econometric result that solidifies the descriptives statistics above. It shows
that the shock of mortgage to households can be attributed to the intensive
margin. 2009 and 2010 were no exception for the different income groups
and had the most severe economic consequences.
5.3.3 Mortgage refinance and impact on the consumption
As seen in the descriptive above, the mortgage refinance is the biggest
component of the mortgage purpose in the data, beside the home purchase
and the home improvement purposes. So, this might be fair to think that
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the shock on the total mortgage could be driven mostly by the shock on the
mortgage refinance. We use the same methodology of mortgage shock to
compute an exogenous Refinance shock. This is, we disentangle the supply
side and the demand components of that part of the mortgage, then use the
exposure of each county to the same three lenders to compute the shock.
We then add this variable to the benchmark model (1). That is, we run the
following regression:
∆Log(Cit) = αi + βt + δ1 × Shockit + δ2 ×Mortg.Re f inanceit + δ3 × Xit + εit
(3)
We run the regression for each year to avoid time trend effect. The results are
in Table 8.
As presented in the table, the coefficient of the refinance shock is positive and
significant at 5%. This simply means a negative refinance shock has a nega-
tive impact on the consumption change.
The two particular years that catch our attention are 2009 and 2010. These
results are somehow expected, considering that those two years were those
where the crisis has made more damages.
Because we look at the channel that drives the effect on the consumption,
we must look at the magnitudes of the coefficients of the mortgage shocks
and compare them with those in table 7. From 2008− 2010, the coefficient
have considerably changed. They have dropped by almost half. This partic-
ular result goes along with the descriptives in Figure 1 where the mortgage
refinance accounts for more than 50% in the total issuance of mortgage. We
would expect that when it comes to the computation of the shocks, we would
have approximately the same results. It attests that the impact of mortgage
shock on the consumption is highly driven by the shock on the mortgage
refinance.
5.3.4 Mortgage and credit card delinquencies and impact on the consump-
tion
A delinquent mortgage is a home loan for which the borrower has failed
to make payments as required in the loan documents (or contract). A mort-
gage is considered delinquent or late when a scheduled payment is not made
on or before the due date. The data we have give us the percent of mortgage
debt that are 90% plus delinquent; that is the mortgage repayment has been
done more than ninety days past the due date.
We would expect that a county where there is a big jump of mortgage delin-
quency would have a large decline on its consumption if facing a mortgage
shock, because they will be more likely to repay their debt by reducing more
their consumption.
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To attest whether the mortgage delinquency is a channel through which
there is an effect on the consumption, we run the following the regression:
∆Log(Ci) = α + δ1 × Shocksi + δ2 × ∆Mortg.Delinq + δ2 × Xi + εi
But in the data we find that: There is not real effect on the consumption,
the magnitude is almost null, but there is also not a change on the effect of
the mortgage shock on consumption (when comparing to the results on table
7). This could mean that this channel is not the one through which there is
an effect of the mortgage shock on the consumption. Looking further in the
analysis, we see that, this effect is not really surprising, because when we
look at the descriptives statistics , we noticed that the mean is very low (be-
low 5%), which means that, although the mortgage debt is high, only a low
percentage of the mortgage debt is considered as delinquent. The credit card
delinquency obeys the same definition and the same computation methodol-
ogy as the mortgage delinquency.
The idea is that a delinquent household would have a a reduction of his cur-
rent and future consumption if there happens to be a reduction in the offer of
mortgage. Even in the case where there is no issuance of new mortgage, he
will still reduce his consumption because of the payment of his debt that he
has to honour.
To look at the credit card delinquency as a potential channel that drives the
effect of the consumption, we run the the regression:
∆Log(Ci) = α + δ1 × Shocksi + δ2 × ∆Credit_Card.Delinq + δ2 × Xi + εi
As the mortgage delinquency, we have no effect on the consumption and
the magnitude of the coefficient are almost null. Furthermore, the coefficients
of the supply shocks are barely changed comparing to those in Table 7. This
implies that the credit card delinquency is not a channel through which the
mortgage shock would affect consumption.
As mentioned above, a mortgage delinquency is a non payment of the
mortgage on a specific due date. Thus, a county that is delinquent can be
considered as a constrained one 22, because he has a debt he failed to pay;
therefore, when households living in that county seek for a new mortgage,
because the county already has a bad credit report, there is sort of a sys-
temic risk (that everybody faces) that they would face difficulties repaying
the mortgage. They will not be provided with the loan as he required. He
might get a fraction of what he asked or in the worst case, nothing. So, one
22. Mortgage delinquency is taken as a proxy of the constrained agent
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concern is to see wether a previously county reacts strongly to a mortgage
shock or not. To test that hypothesis, we split the counties into 3 equal groups
using the lag value of the mortgage delinquency: Low, Moderate and High
delinquent; we assign a dummy variable to each group and we interact it
with the mortgage shock. We run the following regression:
∆Log(Cit) = δ1.Shocksit × Lowit−1 + δ2.Shocksit ×Modit−1
+δ3 × Shocksit × Highit−1 + δ4 × Xit + εit
where, Lowit−1, Modit−1 and Highit−1 are the dummies for Low, moderate
and high delinquent county the year before, respectively.
The results are consigned in Table 13. As expected, the high delinquent
counties react differently and strongly from the low and moderate ones, al-
though all the coefficients were not significant. In 2009 in particular the co-
efficient of the high delinquent counties is significant at 1%, this is the time
where the crisis was the most severe and high delinquent counties of 2008
were very affected and reduced their consumption expenditures more that
the others. In 2011, we see the same phenomenon even though the consump-
tion expenditures were not reduced as much as they were in 2009. This can be
explained with the argument that this is the aftermath of the crisis. The low
and moderate delinquent counties cut off their consumption expenditures as
well, but the cut off were not significant.
6 Conclusion
The 2008 crisis has had severe consequences on the global financial sys-
tem and different economies as well. As far as the economic field is con-
cerned, many studies pointed the fact that several damages were caused,
from the consumption, to investments, to public finance, etc.
The goal of this paper is to point out a new methodology that focuses on
one particular aspect of the crisis, the supply of the mortgage shocks, and
looked at the repercussions on the non housing consumption. The study ad-
dresses both a theoretical model and an empirical model. Both approaches
converge to the same conclusion, which is a reduction of the consumption
following an adverse mortgage supply shock. The households with low in-
come (more constrained) were the most affected.
The theoretical model was an important part of this study, simply because
it lays out a simple framework on how an adverse shock could have an im-
pact on the non housing consumption, and to point out some heterogeneity
with regards to their income. I then used the theoretical model developed by
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John Mondragon to compute the supply side of the reduction of the mort-
gage issuances.
As for the empirical study, I took the datas from diverse sources (HMDA,
NyFed, Nielsen, IRS) from 2008 to 2011. I first computed the supply mort-
gage shock using the theoretical methodology at the county level, and vali-
dated it through several tests and regressions. Then I run the main regres-
sion to look at the average effect on consumption, and clustering counties by
state. This is because we think that counties in the same state behave almost
the same way, or will be affected at least in a similar way. The main finding
is that a negative shock of mortgage issuance(we can view it as the reduction
of issuance of mortgage) reduce the consumption, as well as en expansion
will increase it. The result is not the same for each year. I found that in 2009
and 2010 the counties were the most affected, because it was the same years
where the crisis was the most severe.
Fast forwarding to the channel that drives the effect on the consumption,
I selected four main factor that could potentially the driver: Mortgage Delin-
quency, credit card delinquency, Income heterogeneity and Mortgage refi-
nance. I found that the main channels are the mortgage refinance shock an
the income heterogeneity. Low income counties are more vulnerable when
they face adverse shock that high income ones. This testifies somehow of the
resilience of high income counties and their ability to cope with the idiosyn-
cratic risk than the low income ones. I also found that the other driver is the
mortgage refinance shock, which accounts approximately for half of the ef-
fect on the consumption. On the other hand, the results show the mortgage
and credit card delinquency not o be considered as driver of the effect, since
they are not significant. Furthermore, the previous high delinquent counties
tend to cut more their actual consumption expenditures following an adverse
shock than the low and moderate delinquent counties, especially in 2009 and
2011.
This paper shed some new light and different mechanism through which
the crisis has affected the real economy in the United States.
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APPENDIX A: THEORETICAL RESULTS
Proof of the Proposition 3.1
The problem to solve is:
max
m,h
{V(C) = u(y1 + m− p.h, h) + βu((1− δ).p.h + y2 − (1 + r)m, h)}
sc:0≤ m ≤ θ.p.h
The utility function is: u(c, h) = ln(c) + α ln(h).
In this case, the Kuhn Tucker conditions provide λ = 0 (the lagrange multi-
plier) and the first order conditions are:

c2 = β(1 + r)c1
(1 + β) αh −
p
c1
+ βp(1−δ)c2 = 0
c1 + ph− y1 −m = 0
c2 + (1 + r)m− y2 − (1− δ)ph = 0
⇒

c2 = β(1 + r)c1
(1 + β) αh −
p
c1
+ βp(1−δ)c2 = 0
c2 + (1 + r)(c1 + ph− y1)− y2 − (1− δ)ph = 0
⇒







β(1 + r)c1 + (1 + r)(c1 + ph− y1)− y2
−(1− δ)ph = 0
⇒
{




(1 + r)(βc1 + c1 + ph− y1)− y2 − (1− δ)ph = 0
⇒

(1 + r)(1 + β)αc1 = ph(r + δ)
(1 + r)(1 + β)c1 + (1 + r)(ph− y1)
−y2 = (1− δ)ph
The combination of the last 2 equations give:
ph
α
(r + δ) + (1 + r)(ph− y1)− y2 − (1− δ)ph = 0
which drives to:
h =
(y2 + (1 + r)y1)α
(r + δ)(1 + α)p
To find c1, we go back to the equation (1 + r)(1 + β)αc1 = ph(r + δ) and
find:
c1 =
y2 + (1 + r)y1
(1 + r)(1 + β)(1 + α)
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We use the equation c2 = β(1 + r)c1 to find:
c2 =
β(y2 + (1 + r)y1)
(1 + β)(1 + α)
The mortgage demand is derived from the equation c1 + ph− y1−m = 0.
We plug the value of c1 found above and obtain the expression:
m =
(y1(1 + r) + y2)(r + δ + α(1 + r)(1 + β))
(1 + r)(1 + β)(1 + α)(r + δ)
− y1










Proof of the Proposition 3.2
Let’s recall that the initial problem to solve is:
max
{c1,c2,m,h}
V(C) = u(c1, h) + βu(c2, h)
sc:

c1 + p.h = y1 + m
c2 + (1 + r)m = (1− δ).p.h + y2
0≤ m ≤ θ.p.h
When the agent/borrower is constrained he hits his constraint. The third
equation in the constraint set becomes
m = θ.p.h
, and his lagrange multiplier is strictly positive. We are not going to solve for
the lagrange multiplier since it’s not the main goal of the study. The concavity
of the utility function ensures the existence of the solution. That solution
must feasible, meaning, should be solution of the system:

c1 + p.h = y1 + m
c2 + (1 + r)m = (1− δ).p.h + y2
m = θ.p.h
23. The full resolution is in Appendix A
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We finally get all the equation in terms of m and the parameters:
c1 = y1 + ( θ−1θ )m
c2 = y2 + (1−δθ − (1 + r))m
h = mθ.p







Construction of the supply shock
In this section, we aim to construct a supply shock of the mortgage that
the households face using a simple framework 24 . The goal is to provide a
theoretical background of the Greenstone and Mas methodology that we use
later on in this paper.
We consider the economy has I counties and J lenders. Each county has
a representative consumer, whereas there will be no representatives lender,
simply because, a lender has the possibility to lend to any given consumer,
regardless his county. The agents solve the exact problem that we’ve devel-
oped above, but there are some differences.
• The first is that, we introduce a lender (or financial intermediary) and
we define a contract between a lender and a borrower as given by the
couple (mij, rij) which are the amount of loan given to the household
associated with the interest rate.
• On the lenders side, each of them face a cost function which takes the
level of lending mij and the cost shifter cj as inputs. That is, σij (mij, cj).
The interest rate - which results from solving the lender’s problem - is
of course a function of the level of lending and the cost shifter: rij =
rij(mij, cj).
• Each lender can originate mortgage to any county, and solve a separate
and static problem 25.
The similarity with the previous model is:
• The mortgage demand by a county i from a lender j - which results from
solving the consumer’s problem - is a function of the interest rate rij, an
24. This has been well elaborated by John Mondragon (2014)
25. We consider the separable problem to simplify the estimations. One could instead de-
cide to take into account a joint problem and look at the optimal lending a lender could give
to different county at the same time. The problem is that it will complicate the estimation by
introducing non linearities, although it would bring efficiency gains.
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a demand shifter di (which also depends on the income, the wealth,
taste, etc.). We therefore have mij = mD(rij, di).
We have the system of two equations that give the equilibrium:{
mij = mD(rij, di)
rij = rij(mij, cj)
It is useful to log-linearize theses equations around an arbitrary point.
This gives us (ignoring the error terms):{
m̂ij = εmrij R̂i + ε
md
ij d̂i
R̂i = εrmij m̂ij + ε
rc
ij ĉj






























d̂i = θrij ĉj + γ
r
ijd̂i
The system above describes how supply side and demand side shocks
manifest themselves in prices and quantity changes between lenders and bor-
rowers. We will use that simple structure to understand how the supply-side
shock to mortgage will be constructed.
The following equation is the econometric specification that will be useful to
empirically compute the supply shock:
m̂ij = θmij ĉj + γ
m
ij d̂i + ηij
Before computing it, we need to address the issue of the source of our data
and describe them.
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1 : Evolution of the loan issuance.
Note: The figure displays the evolution of the mortgage issuance for all the lenders
in U.S.(Banks and mortgage companies) and the purposes of those loans from 2007
to 2011
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Figure 2 : Interest rate.
Note: The figure presents a time series of the mortgage rate from 2007 to 2011. The
data is monthly frequency.
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Figure 3 : Consumption and Mortgage.
Note: The figure presents the comovement of the consumption and the mortgage.
Mortgage is ont he left axis and consumption is on the right one. The variables are
taken in logarithm to reduce the scale.
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Figure 4 : Consumption and Mortgage by Income group.
Note: The figure presents the comovement of the consumption and the mortgage
by income group.The groups are created using the global value of income from
2007 to 2011. This shows the intensive margin of the issuance of the mortgage by
county. Consumption is on the right axis and the mortgage is on the left axis.
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Figure 5 : Consumption and Mortgage by Income group.
Note: The figure presents the comovement of the consumption and the mortgage
by Income group. This shows the extensive margin of the issuance of mortgage by
income. Number of loans in on the right axis and the amount of mortgage is on the
left axis.
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Figure 6 : Share of the 3 lenders
Note: The figure presents the share of the 3 lenders among 8,000 lenders each year
from 2007 to 2011. These lenders are J.P. Chase Morgan, Bank of America and Wells
Fargo.
Figure 7 : Comovement of Mortgage Issuance
Note: The figure presents the comovement of the mortgage issued by the 3 lenders
and by the all the lenders each year. The 3 lenders issuance is on the right axis and
the total mortgage is on the left axis.
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Figure 8 : Distribution of the Mortgage supply Shock
Note: The graph shows the histogram of the estimated mortgage supply shocks.
Figure 9 : Effect of the supply shock on the consumption
Note: The graph shows the evolution of the average effect of the mortgage supply
shock on the consumption.
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Figure 10 : Heterogeneous effects of the supply shock on the consumption
Note: The graph shows the evolution of the average effect of the mortgage supply
shock on the consumption in each income group.
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Table 1 : Summary statistics of consumption.
Mean Std. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
2008 −0.14% 3.01% −2.82% −1.13% −0.13% 0.91% 2.69%
2009 −0.28% 3.63% −3.10% −1.47% −0.34% 0.63% 2.12%
2010 0.21% 3.95% −2.70% −1.06% 0.12% 1.18% 3.28%
2011 0.47% 5.13% −2.42% −0.76% 0.40% 1.45% 3.34%
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of the aggregated con-
sumption growth each year. It gives us which year was at first sight the
worst in terms of the economic activity. It also gives more details to compare
which percentile was more affected by the crisis.
Table 2 : Summary statistics of consumption by Income group.
Year Bottom 25% Middle 50% Top 25%
2008 −0.33% 0.15% −0.08%
2009 −0.39% −0.32% −0.22%
2010 −0.20% 0.06% 0.34%
2011 0.50% 0.36% 0.57%
Note: This table computes the mean of the consumption growth by In-
come groups. It allows us to see if there is a substantial difference in each
income groups.
Table 3 : Summary statistics of computed shocks.
St.dev. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
2008 0.40% 0.32% 0.46% 0.68% 0.94% 1.24%
2009 0.24% −0.27% −0.17% −0.01% 0.10% 0.27%
2010 0.12% −0.39% −0.30% −0.21% −0.14% −0.10%
2011 0.37% −1.17% −0.88% −0.59% −0.38% −0.25%
Note: This table gives us brief statistics of the computed shock
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Table 5 : Correlation of the mortgage supply shock and the omitted
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DTI −3.15e− 05 −2.10e− 06
(0.025) (1.97e− 06)
Total Debt −9.97e− 05∗∗ −1.37e− 04∗∗∗
(0.002) (4.6e− 05)
Log Income −1.14e− 04 4.46e− 04∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE No No No No
Obs 8595 8600 8598 8593
R2 0.742 0.742 0.741 0.742
F-Stat 142.37 141.70 144.01 97.80
Note: This table analyses the relationship between our estimated mort-
gage supply shocks and some county-level variables. The dependent vari-
able is the mortgage supply shock. All regression include constant. Standard
error are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level.
Table 6 : Correlation between the mortgage supply shock and county-level
variables (year by year)
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
DTI 1.42e− 04 5.05e− 05 1.91e− 06∗∗∗ −1.03e− 04∗∗∗
(1.13e− 04) (3.89e− 05) 7.47e− 07 (3.61e− 05)
Total Debt −0.001 5.07e− 04 −8.3e− 04 −0.001∗
(0.002) (6.17e− 04) (1.87e− 04) (8.1e− 04)
Log Income 0.001 −1.19e− 04 5.23e− 04∗ 4.28e− 04
(0.002) (6.07e− 04) (1.6e− 04) (7.80e− 04)
Obs 2078 2078 2073 2078
R2 0.038 0.095 0.191 0.223
F-Stat 3.06 6.73 35 34.02
Note: This table analyses the relationship between our estimated mort-
gage supply shocks and some county-level variables. The regression is done
year by year. The dependent variable is the mortgage supply shock. All re-
gression include constant. Standard error are in parentheses. *, ** and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 7 :Average effect on the consumption
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Supply Shock 0.037∗ 0.771∗∗ 1.181∗∗ −0.229
(0.020) (0.312) (0.480) (0.398)
∆ Income −0.00064 −0.0283 0.012∗∗ 0.007
(0.009) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2150 2150 2149 2149
R2 0.255 0.266 0.262 0.164
F-Stat 10.01 21.48 25.29 0.58
Note: This table analyses the average effect of the mortgage supply shock
on the non housing consumption. The regression is done year by year. The
dependent variable is the change in non housing consumption. The results
are clustered by State, to group the counties as much as possible. All regres-
sions include constant. Standard error are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 8 :Income heterogeneity Channel
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Bottom 25% 0.185∗ 1.420∗∗ 2.022∗ −0.432
(0.105) (0.565) (1.070) (0.502)
Middle 50% 0.155∗ 0.396∗ 1.312∗∗ −0.328
(0.085) (0.220) (0.520) (0.400)
Top 25% 0.095∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.902∗ −0.503∗
(0.385) (0.081) (0.485) (0.260)
∆ Income −0.003 −0.019 0.018∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1952 1981 2004 2010
R2 0.401 0.311 0.308 0.278
Note: This table analyses the heterogeneous effect of mortgage supply
shock on consumption for each income group. We include the income het-
erogeneity to see wether it carries out some significant effects. The regression
is done year by year. The dependent variable is the change in consumption.
All regression include constant. Standard error are in parentheses. *, ** and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 9 :Mortgage Refinance Channel
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Supply Shock 0.015∗ 0.430∗∗ 0.412∗∗ −0.120
(0.009) (0.206) (0.169) (0.880)
Refinance Shock 0.017∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.632∗∗ −0.118
(0.009) (0.146) (0.254) (0.900)
∆ Income 0.0033 0.0079 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.040) (0.002) (0.003)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2150 2149 2149 2149
R2 0.472 0.391 0.385 0.186
F-Stat 23.52 23.20 27.13 11.63
Note: This table analyses the relationship between our estimated mort-
gage supply shocks and the non housing consumption. We include the mort-
gage refinance shock to see wether it carries out some significant effects. The
regression is done year by year. The dependent variable is the change in con-
sumption. All regression include constant. Standard error are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 10 :Credit card delinquency Channel
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Supply Shock 0.030 0.766∗ 1.176∗ −0.236
(0.282) (0.400) (0.710) (0.405)
∆Credit cards Delinq 0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0005 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
∆ Income −0.0004 −0.0300 0.0130∗ 0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.030)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2150 2150 2149 2149
R2 0.0262 0.0256 0.0291 0.0166
F-Stat 0.74 12.19 24.01 0.39
Note: This table is a variation of Table 7 above. It analyses a potential
channel through which the consumption might be affected. We include the
change (in percentage point) in the credit card delinquency to see wether
it carries out some significant effects. The regression is done year by year.
The dependent variable is the change in consumption. All regression include
constant. Standard error are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 11 :Mortgage delinquency Channel
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Supply Shock 0.039∗ 0.789∗ 1.201∗∗ −0.230
(0.281) (0.463) (0.854) (0.411)
∆ Mortgage Delinquency −0.0007 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
∆ Income −0.0014 −0.0260 0.0138∗∗ 0.0069
(0.003) (0.004) (0.0068) (0.003)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2150 2150 2149 2149
R2 0.0277 0.0296 0.0286 0.0162
F-Stat 12.10 12.47 14.72 0.17
Note: This table is a variation of Table 7 above. It analyses a potential
channel through which the consumption might be affected. We include the
change (in percentage point) in the mortgage delinquency to see wether it
carries out some significant effects. The regression is done year by year. The
dependent variable is the change in consumption. All regression include
constant. Standard error are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 12 :Delinquency heterogeneity effects on the consumption
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011)
Low 0.034 0.236 0.288 −0.395
(0.132) (0.632) (0.639) (0.278)
Moderate 0.081 0.387 0.338 0.444∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.558) (0.960) (0.133)
High 0.287 2.096∗∗∗ 0.554 0.717∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.556) (0.403) (0.197)
∆ Income −0.010 −0.014 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2150 2150 2150 2150
R2 0.100 0.375 0.130 0.132
Note: This table analyses the heterogeneous effect of mortgage supply
shock on consumption for each mortgage delinquency group. We include
the mortgage status of the previous year to see if it carries a significant effect.
The regression is done year by year. The dependent variable is the change in
consumption. Standard error are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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